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INTRODUCTION
The bulk of the evidence in commercial litigation is often con-
tained within various documents produced in the course of a com-
mercial enterprise. In general, the "hearsay rule" would prevent
relevant information contained within such commercial documents
from being admitted into evidence.1 On the other hand, obtaining
1. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, hearsay is an oral or written "statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." See note 16. Federal Rule 802 pro-
hibits the admission of hearsay into evidence except as provided by other rules. For a fur-
ther discussion of what constitutes hearsay, see Ralph Adam Fine, A Guide through the
Hearsay Thicket, 11 Okla City U L Rev 83 (1986).
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testimony from witnesses as to the information contained within
such documents would usually be extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible. As such, Congress provided the "Business Records Excep-
tion" in Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter
"Rule 803(6)"), which allows many commercial documents to be
admitted into evidence without a witness testifying about the in-
formation contained therein.2 In addition, the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence contain hearsay exclusions and other exceptions which may
also be used to enter a commercial document into evidence.
In the course of a large commercial litigation case, the authors of
this article encountered many documentary evidence issues. This
article is a product of the research conducted with regard to such
issues. The article provides a practical discussion of the application
of many of the rules of evidence encountered in litigation that de-
pends upon information contained in commercial documents. In
addition, the article suggests certain methods of having such docu-
ments admitted into evidence. The article analyzes issues primarily
with respect to the Federal Rules of Evidence, but does provide
some common law and state law analysis.
This article is divided into five sections. Section one is a general
discussion of Rule 803(6) and its usual application, including the
necessary foundation. Section two discusses the problem of lay
opinion testimony contained within business records. The third
section covers multiple levels of hearsay in business records includ-
ing the difficulties encountered When records prepared by one en-
tity are integrated into those of another entity. Section four dis-
cusses the following exclusions from and exceptions to the hearsay
rule: (1) the public records exception, (2) admissions of a party, (3)
past recollection recorded, and (4) the "catch-all" exception. Fi-
nally, the fifth section will discuss an issue germane to all docu-
mentary evidence: authentication.
I. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RULE 803(6)
Throughout the history of our modern legal system, courts have
considered documents maintained in the regular course of a busi-
ness to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence for the
truth of the matter recorded. The common law exception to the
2. FRE 803(6). See note 15 and accompanying text.
3. See Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 306 at 872 (West, 3d ed
1984); John Henry Wigmore, 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1518 at 426-30, as revised by James H.
Chadbourn (Little Brown and Co., 1974); Radtke v Taylor, 105 Or 559, 210 P 863 (1922),
1992
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hearsay rule for regularly kept business records evolved from a
more restrictive approach. This approach required that the party
using the records not have a clerk and file a "supplemental oath"
as to the justness of the information; that the records "look" hon-
est; and that witnesses testify that the records look honest.
4
Eventually these requirements evolved into a broader standard:
The common law [business records] exception had four elements: (a) the
entries must be original entries made in the routine of a business, (b) the
entties must have been made upon the personal knowledge of the recorder
or of someone reporting to him, (c) the entries must have been made at or
near the time of the transaction recorded, and (d) the recorder and his in-
formant must be shown to be unavailable.5
The elements of this exception were not without criticism. For ex-
ample, the limitation to "business records" was thought too re-
strictive.' In addition, there was confusion as to what witnesses
were necessary to lay a proper foundation.7 The criticism and con-
fusion created by the common law business records exception led
to intractable disagreement among the courts, and legislation be-
came necessary to resolve the differences.8
Two statutes were enacted to untangle the various approaches
used for documentary evidence, the Commonwealth Fund Act9 and
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act (hereinafter "the
Uniform Act").10 The Commonwealth Fund Act provided that:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the
regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such
business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act,
transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All
other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its
weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall
questioned in Simon v City of San Francisco, 79 Cal 2d 590, 180 P2d 393, 394 (1947); 30 Am
Jur 2d Evidence §§ 918-926 (1967).
4. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 305 at 871 (cited in note 3).
5. Id, § 306 at 872. See also Charles V. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46
Iowa L Rev 276, 282 (1961).
6. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 306 at 872 (cited in note 3).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id, § 306 at 873 n 3.
10. Id.
Vol. 30:205
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include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.1
The Uniform Act provided the following basis for admission of
documentary evidence:
§ 1. Definition. The term "business" shall include every kind of business,
profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried
on for profit or not.
§ 2. Business Record. A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far
as being relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was
made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condi-
tion or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information,
method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
12
In 1975, Congress codified the business records exception in the
Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule 803(6).'" This new Rule at-
tempted to incorporate and preserve the advantages of the com-
mon law, the Commonwealth Fund Act, and the Uniform Act. 4
A. Rule 803(6)
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule:. . . (6) A memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other quali-
fied witness, unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.15
This hearsay exception for regularly kept business records is justi-
fied on grounds analogous to those underlying other exceptions to
the hearsay rule. 6 Such grounds are that the hearsay statement
11. Edmund Morris Morgan, The Law of Evidence, Some Proposals for Its Reform
63 (Yale Univ. Press, 1927); Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 306 at 873 n 3 (cited in
note 3) ("Several states and the Congress adopted this Act. For federal courts it has been
superseded by Federal Rule 803(6)").
12. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 306 at 873 n 3 (cited in note 3), citing 9A
ULA 506 (1965) ("After wide adoption, the Uniform Act was superseded by Original Uni-
form Rule 63(13), which in turn has been superseded by Revised Uniform Rule (1974)
803(6). The Federal Rule and the Revised Uniform Rule are identical").
13. FRE 803(6), amended by Pub L No 94-149, § 1(11), 89 Stat 805 (1975).
14. FRE 803(6) advisory committee's note.
15. FRE 803(6).
16. "Hearsay" is defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 801, which provides:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-verbal
210 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 30:205
may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient
to justify non-production of the declarant in person at trial, even
though the declarant may be available. The reason for the unusual
reliability of business records is invariably said "to be supplied by
systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce
habits of precision by actual experience of business in relying
upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate report as part of a
continuing job or occupation."' 17 As such, the principal precondi-
tion to admission of documents as business records is that the
records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered
reliable.' 8
Two major difficulties face counsel seeking to use the business
records exception. The first is "understanding the interplay be-
tween personal knowledge and the business duty to record in de-
fining the scope of the exception in any given context."' 9 The other
difficulty is presented when multiple levels of hearsay exist within
a business record offered for its truth.20 "The fundamental princi-
ple of the business records exception [is] that the business record
begins at the point where there is a coalescence in one person of
personal knowledge of the relevant facts and a business duty to
either record those facts or report them to another for record-
ing."' 2' Only after this point is the rationale of the business records
exception valid since perception, memory and sincerity problems
underlying the hearsay rule are then sufficiently diminished to jus-
tify the exception.2
Not all records that are regularly maintained in the course of
business are admissible under the business records exception. As
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. (b) Declarant. A "declar-
ant" is a person who makes a statement. (c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
FRE 801.
17. FRE 803(6) advisory committee's note, citing Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence
§§ 281, 286, 287 at 828, 833-34 (cited in note 3); Laughlin, 46 Iowa L Rev at 276 (cited in
note 5).
18. Coates v Johnson & Johnson, 756 F2d 524 (7th Cir 1985), disagreed with by mul-
tiple cases as stated in Latinos Unidos de Chelsea En Accion v Secretary of Housing &
Urban Dev., 799 F2d 774, 786 (1st Cir 1986).
19. Paul R. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence 633 (Mat-
thew Bender & Co., 2d ed 1990).
20. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 633 (cited in note
19). See also notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
21. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 638 (cited in note
22. Id.
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previously indicated, there is an overriding limitation on the busi-
ness records exception. Such limitation is that the records be pre-
pared in a manner which lends trustworthiness to the records. If
conditions indicate the records lack such trustworthiness, courts
should exclude the records from evidence.
23
Most notably, the courts do not generally consider documents
prepared with an eye toward litigation to be sufficiently trustwor-
thy under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.24 It
should be further noted that Rule 803(6) merely provides that the
documents described therein are not to be excluded by the hearsay
rule. Nothing in Rule 803(6) says that a business record may not
be excluded by some other rule. For example, under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, a business record can be excluded if the opponent
has demonstrated that the record's value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because of the oppo-
nent's inability to test the record.2 5 A court can also exclude a doc-
ument if it is too confusing or voluminous.26
B. Use of Rule 803(6)
Regularly kept records may be offered into evidence in many dif-
ferent situations, although in almost all situations a proponent will
offer the record as evidence of the truth of its terms. In such a
case, the evidence is clearly hearsay and some exception to the
hearsay rule must be invoked if the court is to admit the record.
Often, a proponent will not use the business records exception be-
cause the record comes within the terms of an exclusion or another
exception to the hearsay rule. For example, if the record was made
by a party-opponent, it may be admissible against such party as an
admission. If the entrant is produced as a witness, the record
may be used to refresh his memory 2s or may be read into evidence
23. Id at 640; United States v Patterson, 644 F2d 890, 900-01 (1st Cir 1981).
24. - Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 640 (cited in note
19), citing Palmer v Hoffman, 318 US 109 (1943). See also AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v Illinois
Tool Works Inc., 896 F2d 1035, 1045 (7th Cir 1990) (documents produced in the course of
litigation are "dripping with motivations to misrepresent"), citing Hoffman v Palmer, 129
F2d 976, 991 (2d Cir 1942), aft'd, Palmer v Hoffman, 318 US 109 (1943).
25. See note 87 and accompanying text.
26. See note 139 and accompanying text.
27. See FRE 801(d)(2). See also notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
28. See FRE 612. When a witness suffers from a failed memory the interrogating
counsel may use a writing or other item to induce recollection. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the writing "serves only to refresh the witness' recollection and not as an indepen-
dent source of evidence." Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence 80
1992
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pursuant to the past recollection recorded exception.2 9 Sometimes,
a record may be admissible as a declaration against interest.30
As the previous discussion illustrates, more than one exception
or combination of exceptions and exclusions may apply to a record
at the same time. In such a case, counsel must make a tactical de-
cision as to which exception to use. For records of public offices or
agencies though, there is authority that such records are governed
exclusively by Federal Rule 803(8) and not by Rule 803(6).," Cer-
tain considerations in determining which hearsay exclusion or ex-
ception to use are discussed in section IV of this article.
Rule 803(6) requires testimony by a qualified witness for admis-
sion of a business record into evidence. Admission is proper under
Rule 803(6) even if the foundation is established by a witness who
is not an employee of the entity that owns and prepares the docu-
ments.2 Usually, however, the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness who can explain the recordkeeping of an organi-
zation is essential for the admission of documents under Rule
803(6)." 3 The phrase "other qualified witness" should be given the
broadest interpretation; the witness need not be an employee of
the entity so long as the witness understands the system.3 4 "A
foundation for admissibility may at times be predicated on judicial
notice of the nature of the business and the nature of the records
as observed by the court, particularly in the case of bank and simi-
lar statements." 5 "Alternatively, the parties may stipulate that the
records were filed and prepared in the regular course of business,
or an admission of a party may establish that the records were
ones of regularly conducted activity, or the records may be admis-
(West, 1978).
29. See FRE 803(5). See also notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
30. See FRE 804(b)(3). Declarations against interest must be adverse to the interest
of the declarant at the time of the declaration and the declarant must be unavailable. The
exception has its most frequent application where the declarant is not a party. Lilly, An
Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 260 (cited in note 28).
31, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 242 (cited in note 28).
32. Saks Int'l, Inc. v M/V "Export Champion," 817 F2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir 1987);
United States v Hathaway, 798 F2d 902, 906 (6th Cir 1986); NLRB v First Termite Control
Co., 646 F2d 424, 426 (9th Cir 1981).
33. See, for example, First Termite Control Co., 646 F2d at 427, citing Jack B. Wein-
stein & Margaret A. Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence T 803(6)[02] at 151-52 (Matthew
Bender & Co., 1981).
34. See United States v Phillips, 515 F Supp 758, 763 (E D Ky 1981). See also In re
Beverage Transport, Inc., 2 Bankr 367, 369 (Bankr W D N Y 1980), citing Weinstein &
Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence at % 803(6)[02] (cited in note 33).




sible pursuant to the residual hearsay exception of Rule 803(24). ' '36
The custodian or other qualified witness who testifies on behalf
of documents under Rule 803(6) need not have "personal knowl-
edge" of the actual creation of the document.37 It suffices that such
person states that it is a business practice to prepare the document
with data supplied by someone with personal knowledge of the act
or event recorded.38 Nor is there any requirement under Rule
803(6) that the records be prepared by the party who has custody
of the documents and seeks to introduce them into evidence. 
e
It is important to note that the determination of whether, in all
circumstances, the records have sufficient reliability to warrant
their receipt into evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial judge.40 Many courts take a generous view of Rule 803(6) and
construe it to favor admission of a document into evidence rather
than exclusion if the document has any probative value at all.
41
The trier of fact can usually identify self-serving or untrustworthy
records and discount the weight of the evidence accordingly.
42
C. Elements of Rule 803(6)
The primary elements that must be satisfied for a document to
be admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6) are:
(1) made as a regularly conducted business activity;
(2) contemporaneity;
(3) made by a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted by a
person with knowledge; and
(4) person records acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses.
43
1. Regularly Conducted Business Activity
In the past, numerous courts required that business records be
36. Id at 178-79. For a discussion of Rule 803(24) see notes 164-65 and accompanying
text.
37. See United States v Rose, 562 F2d 409, 410 (7th Cir 1977).
38. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 237 (cited in note 28).
39. United States v Hutson, 821 F2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir 1987), citing Mississippi
River Grain Elevator, Inc. v Bartlett & Co., 659 F2d 1314, 1319 (5th Cir 1981).
40. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v American Motor Sales Corp., 780 F2d 1049, 1060
(1st Cir 1985), questioned in Stamps v Ford Motor Co., 650 F Supp 390 (N D Ga 1986);
United States v Lavin, 480 F2d 657, 662 (2d Cir 1973). See also Coates, 756 F2d at 549
(district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence pursuant to Rule
803(6)).
41. United States v Freidin, 849 F2d 716, 722 (2nd Cir 1988).




made in a regular practice of a business activity.44 However, under
Rule 803(6), records are customarily admitted if made in the
course of business without regard to whether the particular type of
record is routinely made except where the court is concerned with
the trustworthiness of the record.45 Rule 803(6) should be inter-
preted so that the absence of routineness without more is not suffi-
ciently significant to require exclusion of the record.46 Non-routine
records made in the course of a regularly conducted business
should be admissible if they meet the other requirements of Rule
803(6) unless the source of information or other circumstances in-
dicate a lack of trustworthiness.
47
For example, informal notebooks kept by employees to aid in
their work or notes made in the course of negotiations for a busi-
ness opportunity satisfied Rule 803(6) despite their irregular na-
ture since there was no showing that the documents were inaccu-
rate or untrustworthy.48 Even personal records kept for business
reasons may be able to qualify under Rule 803(6). Such personal
records were at issue in United States v Hedman,49 where the
court ruled that a diary kept by a contractor's employer recording
every payoff he had made to a city building inspector was properly
admitted into evidence because it related to a regularly conducted
business activity rather than a personal matter.5
In certain circumstances, however, courts have interpreted Rule
806(3) literally, and required that a document be made as a "regu-
lar practice" of the business activity for admissibility. In United
44. See, for example, Johnson v Lutz, 253 NY 124, 170 NE 517, 518 (Ct App 1930).
45. Weinstein & Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence % 803(6)[02] at 181-82 (cited in note
33).
46. Id at 182. But see David W. Loisell & Christopher B Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence
657 n 97 (Law Co-op, 1980)(arguing that Congress could not have intended to allow a docu-
ment to be introduced absent the element of routineness); notes 48-54 and accompanying
text.
47. Weinstein & Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence T 803(6)[03] at 182 (cited in note
33).
48. United States v Prevatt, 526 F2d 400, 403 (5th Cir 1976), disagreed with by
United States v Smyth, 556 F2d 1179 (5th Cir 1977); Magnus Petroleum Co. v Skelly Oil
Co., 446 F Supp 874, 883 (E D Wis 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F2d 196 (7th Cir
1979).
49. 630 F2d 1184 (7th Cir 1980), questioned in United States v Nelson, 672 F Supp
812, 816 (D NJ 1987).
50. Hedman, 630 F2d at 1197. Objections by the defense that the diary'was inadmis-
sible because the employer did not require that the diary be kept or that other employees
did not rely on it were dismissed by the court since they went "to the weight rather than the
admissibility" of the diary. Id.
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States v Freidin,51 the court said that the principal precondition to
admission of a document is trustworthiness, but it is not the only
precondition.2 The court held that a memorandum not shown to
have been made pursuant to a regular business practice was inad-
missible.5 As such, if a record is an "isolated document" (i.e., not
made as a regular business practice) certain courts may exclude
the record from evidence.
5 4
2. Contemporaneity
Rule 803(6) requires the record to be made at or near the time of
the events recorded. In the usual case, the time of the event and
the time of the entry should be self-evident from the face of the
record.5 5 The purpose of the contemporaneity requirement is to in-
crease the probability of accuracy. 56 What is sufficiently contempo-
raneous will depend on the "nature of the information recorded,
the immutable reliability of the sources from which drawn and
similar factors. ' 57 The contemporaneity element should be satis-
fied if the record is prepared within a reasonable time after the
occurrence of significant events .5  An industry standard may be
used to show a time frame considered reasonable.5 9
3. Knowledge
Sources of information usually present no substantial problem,
with ordinary business records.6 0 Each participant in the chain
producing the record, from the observer-informant to the final en-
trant, are usually acting in the course of a regularly conducted bus-
iness.8 1 This implies a duty of accuracy since the employer is rely-
51. 849 F2d 716 (2d Cir 1988).
52. Freidin, 849 F2d at 722.
53. Id at 723.
54. In United States v Ramsey, 785 F2d 184 (7th Cir 1986), the court said that "mis-
cellaneous jottings" in the form of desk calendar notes should not be admitted under Rule
803(6) just because they have some connection with a regular business. Ramsey, 785 F2d at
192.
55. Most business records will contain a date somewhere.
56. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 309 at 878 (cited in note 3).
57. Missouri P. R. Co. v Austin, 292 F2d 415 (5th Cir 1961).
58. Williams v Humble Oil & Refining Co., 53 FRD 694, 698 (E D La 1971).
59. Williams, 53 FRD at 698.
60. See generally Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 310 at 878 (cited in note 3);
Wigmore, 5 Evidence §§ 1530, 1555 at 449-62, 478-80 (cited in note 3); 30 Am Jur 2d Evi-
dence §§ 951-53 at 78-82 (1967); 32 CJS Evidence §§ 692-93 at 930-42 (1964).
61. See Wigmore, 5 Evidence § 1530 at 449 (cited in note 3).
1992
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ing on the result.62
As previously discussed, a business record cannot begin until
there is a coalescence in a single person of personal knowledge of
relevant information and a business duty to record or report to an-
other for recordation of that information.6 3 This is because Rule
602 requires that witnesses testify from personal knowledge. 6' The
coalescence of personal knowledge satisfies Rule 602 and the busi-
ness duty to record or report assures that the written account is a
reliable substitute for the testimony of that person.
However, an essential link is often broken because the supplier
of the data is not acting within the course of a regular business.6 5
In such a case, the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the
information itself and the fact that it may be recorded with
scrupulous accuracy is of no consequence.6 Rule 803(6) requires
testimony of an informant with knowledge, acting in the course of
regularly conducted activity, in order for the information to be ad-
mitted into evidence.6 7 As such, courts have generally insisted on
the additional reliability present when all participants in the mak-
ing of a record are under a business duty.68 This judicial require-
ment confirms that courts are the primary arbiters of admissibility
and not the business community.6 "
The crux of the problem is, of course, double hearsay. While the
business records exception may serve to justify admitting the out-
of-court declarations of the maker of the record as to what he said
from his own personal knowledge, it does not follow that this justi-
fies admitting the declaration of someone else simply because the
62. FRE 803(6) advisory committee note.
63. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 638 (cited in note
19).
64. FRE 602 provides:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to
prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony.
This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by
expert witnesses.
FRE 602.
65. White Indus., Inc. v Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F Supp 1049, 1060 (W D Mo 1985),
aff'd, 845 F2d 1497 (8th Cir 1988).
66. United States v Lieberman, 637 F2d 95, 101 (2d Cir 1980).
67. See, for example, Belber v Lipson, 905 F2d 549, 552 (1st Cir 1990) (records of
another doctor not automatically incorporated with the witness' records simply by his gain-
ing custody of them).
68. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 238 (cited in note 28). See also
notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
69. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 239 (cited in note 28).
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maker of the record testifies to it. Thus, a business record contain-
ing an assertion by someone other than the maker should be ad-
mitted to prove the truth of that assertion only if the assertion
itself comes within an exception to or exclusion from the hearsay
rule.70 For example, where the communication of a non-business
declarant qualifies as a spontaneous declaration or a party admis-
sion, the applicable exception could be "linked" with the business
records exception to render the statements admissible."
The "linkage principle" was codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
805. Rule 805 authorizes the admission of hearsay within hearsay if
both statements conform to the requirements of an exception to
the hearsay rule.72 As under the linkage principle, if the inform-
ant's statement qualifies as an admission or excited utterance or as
a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, the
record embodying the statement is admissible under Rule 805 if it
was made in the course of a regularly conducted activity.73 In
United States v Keane, the court held that a statement recorded
in a business record was admissible since it met the state of mind
hearsay exception. 4
White Industries v Cessna Aircraft Co.75 provides that the gen-
eral indicia of trustworthiness required under Rule 803(6) can be
found in some situations where the reporting duty arises by way of
a continuing business relationship between two independent busi-
ness entities. 6 However, the interest of two business entities, even
though a contractual or other business relationship exists between
them, may not coincide or may do so only to a limited degree.
77
The White Industries court concluded that where there is a bind-
ing, continuing contractual requirement for the business relation-
ship and where the circumstances in that respect as well as the
more general circumstances surrounding the entities' relationship
do not suggest a lack of trustworthiness, an independent business
70. Grogg v Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 841 F2d 210, 213 (8th Cir 1988). See also Lilly,
An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 239 (cited in note 28).
71. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 239 (cited in note 28).
72. FRE 805 provides: "Hearsay Within Hearsay. Hearsay included within hearsay is
not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with
an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules." FRE 805.
73. Weinstein & Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence T 803(6)[04] at 191 (cited in note
33).
74. United States v Keane, 522 F2d 534, 558 (7th Cir 1975), aft'd, 852 F2d 199 (7th
Cir 1988). The state of mind hearsay exception is contained in FRE 803(3).
75. 611 F Supp 1049 (W D Mo 1985), aff'd, 845 F2d 1497 (8th Cir 1988).




entity which supplies information to another may, in fact, be
deemed to be acting under a business duty for purposes of Rule
803(6). 78
4. Matters Recorded
Rule 803(6) departs considerably from the previous practice in
its treatment of what matters may be recorded. 9 In particular,
Rule 803(6) allows the admission of opinions recorded in business
records.s0 Entries in the form of opinions are not encountered in
traditional business records because items usually recorded are of a
purely factual nature.8 1 However, Rule 803(6) explicitly makes
opinion evidence admissible under the business records exception.
It is unclear, though, whether the requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 701 are overridden by Rule 803(6) with regard to opin-
ions of lay witnesses.s2 Under Rule 701, opinions of lay witnesses
must be rationally based on perception and helpful to a clear un-
derstanding of their testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue. 3
Apparently Rule 803(6) overrides Rule 701 to a certain extent,
"but this does not mean that the requirements of Rule 701 are ig-
nored.""4 For example, firsthand or personal knowledge of the re-
corder or his informant is still required for a business record to be
admissible. Such requirement generally approximates the "ration-
ally based on perception" requirement of Rule 701. "The most sig-
nificant change that the inclusion of opinions in the business
records exception appears to have brought about is the practical
consequence of a shift in the burden of persuasion to the opponent
to show a basis for excluding an opinion once a proponent has sat-
isfied the elements of Rule 803(6). ''1 5 It should be noted, however,
that if the opinions in a record are totally subjective evaluations, a
78. Id at 1053.
79. See Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 650 (cited in
note 19).
80. See notes 79-130 and accompanying text.
81. See Forward Communications Corp. v United States, 608 F2d 485, 510 (Ct Cl
1979).
82. See generally Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 659
(cited in note 19) (concluding that such situations should be decided by applying Rule 403).
See also notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
83. FRE 701.
84. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 660 (cited in note
85. See United States v Licavoli, 604 F2d 613 (9th Cir 1979).
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court is more likely to exclude the record because of the danger of
unfair prejudice due to an increased need to cross-examine the one
who formed the opinions.86
Opinions commonly appear in letters and reports offered as busi-
ness records. Such opinions are frequently very damaging to an ad-
versary's case. As such, the issue of the admissibility of an opinion
contained in a business record is often significant. Such issue is the
focus of Section II of this article.
D. Rule 403 Considerations
As previously discussed, a court may exclude a document pursu-
ant to Rule 403 even if it meets the requirements of the business
records or any other hearsay exception. Application of Rule 403 is
a necessary step in any evidentiary analysis. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 403 state that "unfair
prejudice within its context means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily,
an emotional one."
One state court has suggested a four-step process for the appli-
cation of Rule 403. "First the trial judge should assess the propo-
nent's need for the . . . evidence. '8 7 Second, the judge should "de-
termine how prejudicial the evidence is." '88 That is, how distracting
(from the true issues in the case) the evidence will be to the jury.89
Third, the judge should balance the proponent's need for the evi-
dence against the countervailing danger of unfair prejudice.90 The
last step is for the judge to make a ruling either to admit the evi-
dence, exclude the evidence, or admit the evidence in part.91
The court in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v Chicago Eastern Corp.92
applied such an analysis. The issue in Bethlehem Steel involved
86. See Della Publishing Co. v Whedon, 577 F Supp 1459, 1464 n 5 (S D NY 1984).
87. State v Mayfield, 302 Or 631, 733 P2d 438, 447 (1987) (although state law ap-
plied, the Oregon Rule of Evidence 403 is the same as Federal Rule 403).
88. Mayfield, 733 P2d at 447.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id, citing Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct §§ 8.01-8.03 (Calla-
ghan, 1984).
92. 863 F2d 508 (7th Cir 1988).
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fractures in steel components.9 3 The steel was provided by the de-
fendant, while the components were designed by the plaintiff. 4
The defendant wished to enter into evidence an internal memoran-
dum with a damaging statement.9 5 The trial court only allowed the
evidence to be used to refresh the witness' memory, but the plain-
tiff claimed the testimony should be kept out on Rule 403
grounds.96 The Seventh Circuit held that the memorandum was
properly used because (1) it was important evidence with regard to
a fraud claim of the plaintiff, and (2) the court could not say the
trial court abused its discretion in finding that the probative value
outweighed any prejudicial effect because the testimony was lim-
ited in the scope of its admission.
II. LAY OPINION TESTIMONY WITHIN A BUSINESS RECORD
Business records often contain statements which are an opinion
of an informant or of the recorder. These opinions can sometimes
be extremely relevant and helpful to a proponent seeking to prove
a proposition. Unfortunately, even if the document meets the re-
quirements of the business records exception, there is still the risk
that the relevant statement is inadmissible because it is in the
form of an opinion. The rules of evidence, however, allow courts to
properly admit opinions of both experts and lay witnesses con-
tained within a business record.
A. Introduction to Lay Opinion Testimony
At common law, American courts excluded all non-factual testi-
mony of a lay witness.98 This meant that any non-expert witness
could not testify as to his or her inferences, conclusions, or opin-
ions.9 9 The rationale for this basic rule was that permitting lay wit-
nesses to express an opinion or a conclusion would usurp the jury's
function, that of drawing a conclusion based on the facts
93. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F2d at 517.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The internal memorandum read (and the witness testified):
Armco [a testing agency) is planning to assist Chicago Eastern Corporation in find-
ing if our present material could become overstressed due to our present designs.
Armco does not feel that the basic problem is a material problem, but a design prob-
lem. Id.
97. Id.
98. For the purposes of this article, the term "lay witness" shall refer to any witness
who has not been qualified as an expert witness.




Other considerations, however, ultimately led to the adoption of
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Rule
701"). Rule 701 reads:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) help-
ful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue.
Rule 701 eliminates the presumption that lay opinion testimony is
inadmissible. 10' To be admissible, the opinion testimony need only
be "helpful" to the finder of facts.
10 2
Many courts at common law required that even if an opinion
was admissible, the underlying facts must be testified to as well, so
that the jury could see what the opinion was based upon. 03 This
was known as the "primary facts doctrine. 1 0 4 Whether or not the
primary facts doctrine is carried through to Rule 701 is unclear.
For example, it could be argued that the jury cannot meaningfully
evaluate the witness' opinion and come to an independent decision
unless the witness discloses the underlying facts. 10 5 "On the other
hand, one could argue that the requirement is impractical because
most of the instances in which lay opinions are necessay or appro-
priate are such that a meaningful delineation of the underlying
facts is difficult, if not impossible.' 0 It appears that the Seventh
Circuit has adopted the latter position.
0 7
While Rule 701 reflects the common law concern of lay witnesses
usurping the function of a jury, it is also concerned with putting
the trier of fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the
100. Id. See, for example, Gerler v Cooley, 41 Ill App 2d 233, 190 NE2d 488 (1963).
101. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 1031 (cited in note
19).
102. Id. See also Hurst v United States, 882 F2d 306, 312 (8th Cir 1989) (lay witness
may give opinion only if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and would
help the fact finder determine a matter in issue).
103. See, for example, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v Schultz, 43 Ohio 270, 1 NE 324,
331 (1885).




107. See United States v Jackson, 688 F2d 1121 (7th Cir 1982) (opinion testimony of
a lay witness allowed where the witness could not adequately communicate to the jury the
facts upon which his or her opinion was based).
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event.10s The underlying basis is that as a witness translates his or
her observations into testimony, a substantial amount of informa-
tion is lost."0 9 For example, the statement "Jones looked very wor-
ried" conveys a more complete message than a statement of facts
on which that opinion is based. If the courts required testimony as
to the facts alone, the witness might testify that Jones was sweat-
ing, tapping his pencil, stuttering, or similar factual observations.
But these facts can simply be summarized in the statement "Jones
looked very worried." Situations like this led to the, relaxation of
the common law rule.
One leading author indicates that there are five considerations a
court will use when determining whether to allow opinion testi-
mony of a lay witness:
1.) The degree to which the testimony touches upon an ultimate issue in the
case (the closer the testimony is to the ultimate issues, the greater the de-
gree of factual specificity required);
2.) the availability of alternative ways in which the parties could present the
evidence to the jury;
3.) the need for the evidence;
4.) the inherent reliability of the kind of opinion involved; and
5.) common sense and convenience. 110
Thus, opinions of a lay witness should be admissible where the na-
ture of the event perceived precludes factual description, or the
witness' conclusions are at least as, if not more, valuable than the
sum of the opinion's factual components."'
A good example of this is where the witness is testifying as to
identity. While a physical description could be given, it would not
alone be sufficient to establish that the witness is identifying the
person. Therefore, a court would allow the witness to express his or
her opinion as to the identity of the person. Courts have also ad-
mitted some opinions on the basis of judicial efficiency, justifying
these admissions by emphasizing a witness' demonstrated ability
to render certain opinions with accuracy."
2
The previously discussed considerations for admissibility of lay
opinions were applied in United States v Jackson.113 In Jackson,
108. See FRE 701 advisory committee's note.
109. Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence at 1023 (cited in
note 19).
110. Id at 1029.
111. Id at 1030. See also Horn v State, 12 Wyo 80, 73 P 705 (1903).
112. Rice, Evidence: Common Law & Federal Rules of Evidence at 1030 (cited in note
19).
113. 688 F2d 1121 (7th Cir 1982).
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the court held that, "Opinion testimony by a lay witness should be
admitted under Rule 701 whenever the witness cannot adequately
communicate to the jury the facts upon which his or her opinion is
based."' 14 Thus, a lay witness whose testimony consists of an opin-
ion must base the testimony on personal observation and recollec-
tion of concrete facts, but must be unable to describe those facts in
sufficient detail to convey the substance of the testimony to the
jury.
115
In other words, if testifying to the specific facts would leave the
same impression on the minds of the jurors as testimony as to the
witness' conclusions or opinions, the court will require testimony
as to only the facts. But if the conclusion or opinion results in
something more, courts should allow the conclusion or opinion into
evidence. Such admission is based on the court employing a "whole
is greater than the sum of its parts" analysis.
The discussion above is illustrated by Bohannon v Pegelow,"6
where the plaintiff sued a police officer who allegedly violated the
plaintiff's civil rights. The trial court allowed the testimony of a
lay witness which took the form of an opinion.17 The witness' tes-
timony was that the plaintiff's arrest (from which the cause of ac-
tion arose) was racially motivated."" On appeal, the defendant-ap-
pellant argued that this was error.1 9 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, however, holding that under Rule 701, the testimony
must merely be "helpful to a clear understanding of [the witness']
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."' 20 The court
went on to find that this determination is "within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge and the issues involved are peculiarly
suited to his determination.' 121 In this case, there was no clear
abuse of discretion and the trial court's decision to admit the opin-
ion testimony was not overturned.
22
An alternative version of the above rules was set forth in United
States v Skeet,' 23 which was cited in Bohannon. In Skeet, the
114. Jackson, 688 F2d at 1124, citing United States v Skeet, 665 F2d 983, 985 (9th Cir
1982).
115. Jackson, 688 F2d at 1124.
116. 652 F2d 729 (7th Cir 1981).
117. Bohannon, 652 F2d at 731.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id at 732.
121. Id.
122. Id at 733.
123. 665 F2d 983 (9th Cir 1982).
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court held that opinion evidence would not be helpful to a jury
"[i]f the jury can be put into a position of equal vantage with the
Wvitness for drawing the opinion.. .. ,,124 This is basically the same
as the holding in Jackson, that the opinion be allowed only if the
facts would not adequately convey the substance of the testi-
mony.11 5 If the opinion will help the jury understand the substance
of the testimony, it is admissible. If the jury is capable of grasping
the substance by hearing the mere facts upon which the opinion is
based, the opinion should be excluded.
Thus, to be successful in admitting lay opinion testimony in gen-
eral, proponents should take the following steps:
(1) Establish personal firsthand knowledge or observation. Otherwise, some
hearsay exception must apply.
(2) Show that the evidence will be "helpful" to the finder of facts.
(3) Be prepared to demonstrate that without the opinion, the testimony as
to the facts alone is either impossible, or insufficient to convey the sub-
stance of the testimony to the jury.
B. Relationship of Lay Opinion Testimony to the Business
Records Exception
Rule 803(6) explicitly makes opinions in business records admis-
sible as an exception to the hearsay rule.'26
1. The Theory of Opinions in Business Records
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(6) indicates that
while some courts at common law were wary of the admissibility of
opinions contained in business records, most federal as well as
state courts favored admissibility. 27 As previously discussed, Rule'
124. Skeet, 665 F2d at 985.
125. Jackson, 688 F2d at 1124. See also Wigmore, 7 Evidence § 1917.8 at 10 (cited in
note 3).
126. See notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
127. "The limited phrasing of the Commonwealth Fund Act, 28 USC § 1732 (the pre-
cursor to the Federal Rules of Evidence), may account for the reluctance of some federal
decisions to admit [opinions in records]." FRE 803(6) advisory committee note, citing New
York Life Ins. Co. v Taylor, 147 F2d 297 (DC Cir 1945); Lyles v United States, 254 F2d 725
(DC Cir 1957); England v United States, 174 F2d 466 (5th Cir 1949); Skogen v Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 375 F2d 692 (8th Cir 1967), superseded by statute as stated in Manko v United
States, 636 F Supp 1419 (W D Mo 1986), aff'd in part and remanded, 830 F2d 831 (8th Cir
1987). See also, for example, Reed v Order of United Commercial Travelers, 123 F2d 252
(2d Cir 1941); Buckminster's Estate v Commissioner, 147 F2d 331 (2d Cir 1944); Medina v
Erickson, 226 F2d 475 (9th Cir 1955); Thomas v Hogan, 308 F2d 355 (4th Cir 1962); Glawe
v Rulon, 284 F2d 495 (8th Cir 1960); Borucki v MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn 92, 3 A2d
224 (1938); Allen v St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 365 Mo 677, 285 SW2d 663 (1956); People v
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701 requires that the opinion of a lay witness be "rationally based
on perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. ' 128 It was also
indicated that although Rule 803(6) overrides the rules on opin-
ions, the requirements of such rules are to an extent incorporated
in Rule 803(6).129 The recorder or his informant under Rule 803(6)
must still have firsthand or personal knowledge, which "generally
approximates" the requirement of "rationally based on percep-
tion" found in Rule 701.130
2. The Shifting Burden
As previously discussed, "[T]he inclusion of opinions in the busi-
ness records exception appears to have brought about. . . a shift
in the burden of persuasion to the opponent to show a basis for
excluding an opinion once the proponent has satisfied the elements
of Rule 803(6)."'131 Thus, if the proponent has established that the
record itself is trustworthy because it was kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, a presumption of reliability
for the opinion would be established. The opponent would then be
required to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness for the opinion.
Practitioners should be aware that at least one court, the Ninth
Circuit, has held that opinions in business records must be given
by an expert. In Clark v Los Angeles,"3 2 the court held that "ex-
pressions of opinion or conclusions in a business record are admis-
sible only if the subject matter calls for an expert or professional
opinion and is given by one with the required competence.''133
However, this holding should be limited to the Ninth Circuit. 3 4
The Ninth Circuit's reliance in Clark upon Standard Oil v
Moore'35 appears misplaced. The Standard Oil decision reflected
the common law rule that laymen should not be allowed to render
Kohlmeyer, 284 NY 366, 31 NE2d 490 (1940); Weis v Weis, 147 Ohio St 416, 72 NE2d 245
(1947).
128. See note 102.




132. 650 F2d 1033 (9th Cir 1981), disagreed with by Palmer v Chicago, 806 F2d 1316
(7th Cir 1986).
133. Clark, 650 F2d at 1037, citing Standard Oil Co. v Moore, 251 F2d 188 (9th Cir
1957).
134. No cases have been found in other jurisdictions which exclude lay opinions as a
general matter.
135. 251 F2d 188 (9th Cir 1957).
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opinions because that was the province of the jury.136 However, the
passage of the Rule 701 displaced the common law rule and greatly
broadened the admissible testimony of lay witnesses. Strangely,
the Clark court does not attempt to reconcile its decision with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. If the opinion at issue in Clark had
been expressed by the witness in courtroom testimony, the opinion
would have been admissible under Rule 701. Under Rule 801, how-
ever, the statement is considered hearsay because the witness did
not testify in person. Ultimately, if an opinion from a live witness
were admissible under Rule 701, there is no reason to exclude such
an opinion when it is contained in a document which falls within
the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception.' 1
In fact, other courts have not required admissible opinions ex-
pressed in business records to be rendered by experts. For exam-
ple, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v American Tel. & Tel.
Co.,1 8 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court judge's refusal
to admit a memorandum which was prepared by a party and con-
tained an opinion. Although the memorandum was kept out of evi-
dence, the decision was based on the rationale that the memoran-
dum was merely cumulative, and not that opinions in records must
be the opinions of an expert."' Six other witnesses had testified to
the same opinion, and thus, although the Seventh Circuit felt that
the trial court judge may have erred in excluding the memorandum
(on grounds that it was not a business record), the error was harm-
less. 14 0 The court did not attempt any analysis of whether or not it
was important that the document be representative of an "expert"
opinion.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Northern District of Illinois held in Manos v Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.' that opinions of officials of the Boeing Corporation
contained within certain documents were admissible because they
were business records under 28 USC § 1732 (superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence). The court noted, however, in making
136. See Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence at 1023 (cited
in note 19).
137. This is roughly analogous to the situation of hearsay within a document, covered
by Federal Rule of Evidence 805, which allows hearsay within hearsay to be admitted if a
foundation for an exception is laid for both instances of hearsay.
138. 708 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1983).
139. MCI Communications Corp., 708 F2d at 1142-43. See note 87 and accompanying
text discussing FRE 403.
140. MCI Communications Corp., 708 F2d at 1143.
141. 324 F Supp 470 (N D Ill 1971).
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its ruling, that the objections went primarily to the weight of the
evidence, and did not explicitly discuss the fact that the docu-
ments contained opinions.142
III. MULTIPLE LEVELS OF HEARSAY WITHIN BUSINESS RECORDS
Multiple levels of hearsay contained in business documents pre-
sent proponents with one of the most difficult problems in using
the business records exception. This difficulty is often encountered
by proponents because many documents record the statements of
informers. One of the most important aspects of the multiple levels
of hearsay problem is the integration of a business record of one
company into the records of another.
A. Multiple Levels of Hearsay in General
Certain business records may contain statements which have
been repeated to the recorder by another person or through a
chain of persons. In such circumstances, the proponent of such a
document is confronted with multiple levels of hearsay which must
be overcome in order to have the statement admitted into evi-
dence. The proponent of a document containing multiple levels of
hearsay can employ certain techniques to gain admission of the
document into evidence.
1. Rule 803(6)
In Johnson v Lutz, 43 the court held that a business records ex-
ception statute required an informant or one imparting informa-
tion recorded in a document to be acting under a business duty.
Most authorities have agreed with this decision. 44 Rule 803(6) fol-
lows this lead in requiring an informant with knowledge acting in
the course of a regularly conducted activity (i.e., a "business
duty"). 145 As such, it is essential under Rule 803(6) that both the
informer (who supplies information from personal knowledge) and
the entrant-recorder (who makes the written entry) act in the reg-
ular course of business (i.e., pursuant to a "business duty"). 46
The rationale of the "business duty" requirement under Rule
803(6) is consistent with the rationale of the business records ex-
142. Manos, 324 F Supp 470.
143. 253 NY 124, 170 NE 517 (1930).
144. FRE 803(6) advisory committee note.
145. Id.
146. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 237 (cited in note 28).
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ception itself. "[I]t draws upon the reliability which presumably
attends to the dutiful conduct of those engaged in business."' 47 If
an informant does not act within the regular course of business,
the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information re-
gardless of whether it was recorded with scrupulous accuracy.
148
"There is a 'multiple hearsay' aspect to all business records which
involve input from more than one person and it is only the fact
that all participants are acting within the course of a regular activ-
ity which justifies the receipt of multiple hearsay. "149
Theoretically, then, a document containing multiple levels of
hearsay can be admissible pursuant solely to Rule 803(6).150 "If the
included statement is by a person acting in the routine of business,
the regularly kept records exception takes care of the matter and
no further exception need be invoked."'151 Therefore, if a propo-
nent can establish that a "business duty" exists for all participants
in a business record, the record should be admitted pursuant to
803(6).
1 At this point, the question becomes: when does a business duty
exist? In United States v Baker,152 the court held that while
"double hearsay exists when a business record is prepared by one
employee from information supplied by another employee," this
would be excused if they were each acting in the regular course of
business.15 3 Many courts have recognized that a business duty
clearly exists between an employee or an agent of the business ac-
tivity in question.14 As such, the clearest example of the existence
of a business duty is in the context of one employee reporting to
another employee of the same entity.
The court in White Industries, Inc. v Cessna Aircraft Co.155 also
found that a business duty may exist under Rule 803(6) where
147. Id at 238.
148. FRE 803(6) advisory committee note.
149. Louisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence at 657 (cited in note 46).
150. See notes 180-82 and accompanying text, discussing the "one step" technique.
151. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 324.3 at 911-12 (cited in note 3).
-152. 693 F2d 183 (DC Cir 1982).
153. Baker, 693 F2d at 188.
154. United States v Pazsint, 703 F2d 420, 424 (9th Cir 1983); Baker, 693 F2d 183,
187-88 (DC Cir 1982); United States v Davis, 571 F2d 568, 572 (10th Cir 1977); Florida
Canal Indus., Inc. v Ramba, 537 F2d 200, 200-03 (5th Cir 1976); United States v Beasley,
513 F2d 309, 314 (5th Cir 1975) (decided under the Federal Business Records Act); United
States v American Radiator & Standard Sanitation Corp., 433 F2d 174, 197 (3d Cir 1970)
(decided under the Federal Business Records Act); City of Cleveland v Cleveland Elec. Illu-
minating Co., 538 F Supp 1257, 1269-71 (N D Ohio 1980).
155. 611 F Supp 1049, 1053 (W D Mo 1985).
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there is a binding, continuing contractual relationship between in-
dependent entities and circumstances do not suggest a lack of
trustworthiness. Further, the White Industries court said that a
contractual relationship is not the only basis on which to find that
a business duty exists. 156 The White Industries court recognized
that the "same general indicia of trustworthiness" that underpins
the rationale for the business records exception could also "be'
found in some situations where the reporting duty arises by way of
a continuing business relationship between two independent busi-
ness entities.
'157
The White Industries court discussed the following as general
indicia of trustworthiness: (1) a business entity's interest in receiv-
ing and relying on information; (2) the element of compulsion and
potential sanction as concerns the reporting entity; and (3) the de-
gree of overlap of the interests of the entities."5 Nevertheless, the
court seemed more wary about a situation in which there is no con-
tractual duty to report.
The mere fact that recordation of third party statements is routine, taken
apart from the source of the information recorded, imports no guaranty of
the truth of the statements themselves. There is no reason for supposing an
intention to make admissible hearsay of this sort. So to construe these
statements would make of them almost limitless dragnets for the introduc-
tion of random, irresponsible testimony beyond the reach of the usual tests
for accuracy.15"
Of particular interest in the area of business duty is Osterneck v
Barwick Indus.,1 60 because documents from public accountants
often play a role in commercial litigation. In Osterneck, the plain-
tiffs laid a proper foundation regarding the engagement of a public
accounting firm by a committee of a company's Board of Directors.
The court recognized that public accountants had a business duty
to their accounting firm and the committee of the Board of Direc-
tors which hired the accounting firm to prepare reports and sum-
maries of financial information.
Unfortunately, as recognized in dicta in White Industries, the
test of when a "business duty" exists is the source of substantial
controversy in case law. Existing case law provides little real ana-
156. White Indus., 611 F Supp at 1061.
157. Id.
158. Id at 1060-61.
159. White Indus., 611 F Supp at 1061 n 3, quoting Note, Revised Business Entry
Statutes: Theory and Practice, 48 Colum L Rev 920, 927 (1948).
160. 106 FRD 327 (N D Ga 1984).
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lytical guidance on this issue beyond the examples discussed
above. As such, whether a statement in a document is admissible
pursuant to a business duty under Rule 803(6) will probably hinge
on establishing the presence of certain circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The concept of such guarantees underpins all the
hearsay exceptions.16'
The lack of case law regarding the "business duty" requirement
also leaves unclear the number of levels of hearsay which may be
permissible under Rule 803(6). Logic dictates that the greater the
number of participants, the greater the chance that the informa-
tion contained in a document may be untrustworthy. As such, a
court may consider factors such as the length of a business rela-
tionship, ethical duties of the reporting entity and the nature of
the statements reported when determining how many levels of
hearsay are admissible. It should be noted that no authority was
found which limited the number of levels of hearsay which can be
admitted.
2. Rule 805
Of course, a proponent need not rely on Rule 803(6) alone when
trying to get a document admitted into evidence. Rule 805 autho-
rizes the admission of hearsay within hearsay if both statements
conform to the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 805, another hearsay exception may
be employed to allow the admission of a hearsay statement within
the context of a business record. 1
62
Once the document is admitted pursuant to Rule 803(6) (or
some other exception), the document becomes the "witness" and
anything it says is considered to be firsthand testimony except tes-
timony of a third party. Where a document testifies as to a state-
ment by a third party, another foundation can be laid for a second
hearsay exception for such statement to be admitted as evidence.
For example, where a job interviewer makes a report on what an
interviewee says, the report should qualify as a business record and
the interviewee's statements should qualify under the state of
mind exception. 63
161. See FRE 803.
162. Courts have taken the view that the business records exception "actually involves
in itself multiple hearsay, namely a primary stage consisting of the record and an included
stage consisting of what was reported to the recorder." McCormick, Evidence § 324.3 at 911-
12 (cited in note 3).




Another hearsay exception that often comes into play where
double hearsay exists is Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24). Rule
803(24) is often referred to as the "residual exception" or the
"catch-all exception." It is useful where hearsay evidence should
be admissible, but none of the other hearsay exceptions seem to
apply. The Advisory Committee knew that the exceptions they had
explicitly created would be insufficient to provide guidance under
every circumstance, so Rule 803(24) was included to give the judge
some extra discretion in the admission of hearsay.16 4 Still, Rule
803(24) does "not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial
discretion, but [does] provide for treating new and presently unan-
ticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within
the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions."'
16 5
"In applying the residual exception, the central focus is upon the
question whether the situation before the court offers 'equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,' i.e., equivalent to
those offered by the various specific hearsay exceptions .... -166
What constitutes an "equivalent circumstantial guarantee of trust-
worthiness" has been determined by looking at various factors,
which are discussed in Section IV.
The residual hearsay exception of Rule 803(24) can be of assis-
tance with problems of multiple hearsay in business records when
it is used in conjunction with Rule 805 (see above)-in such cases
the document itself is the primary hearsay problem. If an adequate
foundation for the business exception has been laid and the docu-
ment itself is admissible, the secondary problem is the admissibil-
ity of the recorded statement of the third party. If the proponent
cannot establish a business duty for the informer to make the
statement, then Rule 805 may be invoked, which allows the propo-
nent to lay a second foundation for another exception to admit the
statement. Assuming either that no other hearsay exception ap-
plies to the statement, the proponent should try to establish
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" under
Rule 803(24).
"The more traditional approach in judging the trustworthiness
Bradley v Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 67 Ill App 3d 156, 384 NE2d 746 (1978).
164. See FRE 803(24). The requirements for use of Rule 803(24) are discussed in Sec-
tion IV of this article.
165. Id.
166. McCormick, Evidence § 324.1 at 907-09 (cited in note 3).
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standard for the admission of hearsay is to examine the credibility
of the extra-judicial declarant and not that of the witness.
167
Thus, it would seem logical that the linking principle of Rule 805
should apply to situations where business records contain third
party statements. If the document is the "witness" by virtue of
meeting the requirements of one of the hearsay exceptions, then
Rule 803(24) serves to judge the trustworthiness of the extra-judi-
cial declarant, and if the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness are present, then the statement should be admitted as
evidence.
B. The Integration of the Records of One Business Entity into
Another
Proponents face one of the most challenging aspects of the mul-
tiple levels of hearsay problem when the records of one company
are integrated into the records of another company.
The following example outlines a typical integration of business
records problem. The Chief Financial Officer of Company A sends
a letter to the President of Company B containing damaging infor-
mation regarding the financial condition of Company A. The Presi-
dent of Company B integrates the letter into a package of records
to be considered by the board of directors of Company B in mak-
ing a decision about a transaction between the two companies. If
litigation results from the subsequent transaction, and one party
wishes to introduce the letter as evidence of the financial condition
of Company A, the party will be faced with the difficulty of intro-
ducing what may be a business record of one company that has
been integrated into the business records of another company.
The integration of business records problem stems from the first
requirement of Rule 803(6). As previously discussed, Rule 803(6)
requires that each person who participates in the making of the
record in question be acting in the routine course of the busi-
ness.168 As such, if a proponent lays a proper foundation showing a
business duty for all participants, the information contained in
both the original record and the second record (into which the
original was integrated) would be admissible.'69
167. Jonathan E. Grant, The Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthi-
ness Standard for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), 90 Dickinson L Rev 75, 83 (1985),
citing Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 18 03(24)[01] at 803-69 (cited in note 33).
168. Loisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence at 655 (cited in note 46). See notes 143-48
and accompanying text.
169. FRE 805. See note 162.
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In United States v Veytia-Bravo, 170 which involved a criminal
prosecution for violations of the regulations of the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms, the court held that records of one com-
pany in the custody of another could be admissible under Rule
803(6).1
Rule 803(6) does not require that the records be prepared by the business
which has custody of them. Where circumstances indicate that the records
are trustworthy, the party seeking to introduce them does not have to pre-
sent the testimony of the party who kept the record or supervised its prepa-
ration. Testimony by the custodian of the record or other qualified witness
that the record is authentic and was made and kept in the regular course of




White Industries, Inc. v Cessna Aircraft Co. is also a leading
case in the area of integrated business records.17 3 In White Indus-
tries, the court held that the document sought to be introduced
must first meet the criteria for the business records exception. The
primary consideration is that of the trustworthiness of the docu-
ment. As discussed above, this trustworthiness can be found in
170. 603 F2d 1187 (5th Cir 1979).
171. Veytia-Bravo, 603 F2d at 1192.
172. Id at 1193-94, citing United States v Colyer, 571 F2d 941 (5th Cir 1978) (prosecu-
tion for illegal use of credit card; purchase tickets evidencing such use were properly re-
ceived, through testimony of assistant bank manager who "pulled the tickets" indicating use
of the particular cards after they were automatically "flagged" by a computer. This testi-
mony sufficed even though the tickets were made by businesses other than the bank.
"Where the circumstances indicate trustworthiness, it is not necessary that the person who
kept the record or even had supervision over its preparation testify." Here the custodian
testified, and he was knowledgeable as to how the cards arrived at the bank and how they
were handled thereafter); United States v Flom, 558 F2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir 1977) (invoices
prepared and sent by one company, held by another, were adequately authenticated as re-
quired by FRE 803(6) by testimony of an official of the latter company without testimony
by anyone from the preparing company. "Under circumstances which demonstrate trustwor-
thiness it is not necessary that the one who kept the record, or even had supervision over
their [sic] preparation, testify"); United States v Jones, 554 F2d 251 (5th Cir 1977) ("not
essential that the offering witness be the recorder or even be certain of who recorded the
item," so long as he is "able to identify the record as authentic and [to] specify that it was
made and preserved in the regular course of business"). See also United States v Carranco,
551 F2d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir 1977) (in prosecution for knowing receipt and possession of
goods stolen from interstate shipment, a freight bill prepared initially by the carrier and
presented in evidence as a business record of a freight terminal was properly received. It was
this freight bill which led to the discovery that the goods here in issue were missing from a
shipment); United States v Pfeiffer, 539 F2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir 1976) (prosecution for
knowing possession of stolen goods; delivery receipts or freight bills prepared by carrier on
basis of manufacturer's bill of lading and transmitted to manufacturer by carrier for pay-
ment were properly received as business records to prove that the tires in issue here were on
a particular shipment which was stolen).
173. White Indus., 611 F Supp 1049 (W D Mo 1985).
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some situations where a contractual relationship exists between
two companies. The White Industries court concluded that where
such a relationship exists, "an independent business entity which
supplies information to another may in fact be deemed to be acting
under a 'business duty' for purposes of Rule 803(6)."' 74
The same issue was considered in United States v Marrinson.
175
Marrinson involved a prosecution for filing a false income tax re-
turn.176 One piece of evidence the government sought to introduce
was deposit slips written by the defendant.177 The defendant ob-
jected on grounds that since the slips were not "made" by the busi-
ness entity which kept them that they were "stranger documents"
and not within the business records exception.'18 The court noted
that this alone did not disqualify the documents, but rather made
the documents suspect. The proponent must establish their trust-
worthiness. "To ensure trustworthiness, the entity which is the
original source of the document must have a relationship with the
entity keeping the document such that reliability arises from the
same sort of incentives as those involved between an employee or
agent and his or her employer company.' 1 79 The deposit slips were
then allowed, since the information about the amount deposited
and the account involved were verified by the bank employee car-
rying out the transactions at the time of the transaction, thus lend-
ing credibility to the slips.8 0
White Industries and Marrinson describe a "one-step" tech-
nique to have the business records of one entity that are integrated
into those of another admitted into evidence. The general idea is
that if you can prove the two entities are closely enough related,
the exception made for the second entity encompasses that of the
first. In other words, the record is considered trustworthy as pro-
duced from the second company because it meets the traditional
business records exception criteria.1 81 Although the second com-
pany did not produce the record, its relationship to the first com-
pany is such that the court will treat the record as if the second
company did produce it. The relationship is close enough that the
174. Id at 1062.
175. United States v Marrinson, 1986 WL 2123 (N D Ill).
176. Marrinson, 1986 WL 2123, 1 (N D Ill).
177. Id.
178. Id at 2.
179. Id, citing White Indus., 611 F Supp at 1061.
180. Marrinson, 1986 WL 2123 at 2.
181. See note 15.
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court can impute the trustworthiness of the second company to the
first.
If the relationship between the two entities is not close enough
to warrant this "one-step" approach, then a "two-step" approach
is called for. In the "two-step" approach, the foundation for the
business records exception is simply laid twice. Once for the first
record and once for the second. As long as the foundational re-
quirements are met for both records, the consolidated record
should be admissible.
182
In order to have business records of a company, which contain
the business records of another company, admitted, the proponent
should attempt to get the record of the integrating company ad-
mitted first by laying a foundation for the business records excep-
tion. This requires the following elements:
(1) The business record was prepared by a person with knowledge;
(2) the person who prepared the record had a duty to report the informa-
tion and prepare the record;
(3) the person who prepared the record had personal knowledge of the facts
and events reported in the record;
(4) the report was prepared at or near the time the acts or events occurred;
(5) it was the regular practice of the business to prepare such reports;...
(6) the preparer's report was made in the regular course of business;
(7) the information reported was of a factual nature;'
8
(8) there are no indications of unreliability or lack of trustworthiness.14
Once this foundation has been laid for the integrating record,
the proponent must establish that a r~lationship existed between
the entities that was either of a contractual nature, or that there is
some other equivalent guarantee of trustworthiness which will al-
low the record that was integrated to come under the umbrella of
the integrating record's foundation. If the proponent cannot show
such a relationship, then the proponent should lay another founda-
tion for the record that was integrated.
182. See FRE 805; note 162.
183. But see notes 127-30 and accompanying text, dealing with opinions in business
records.




IV. EXCLUSIONS AND OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
FOR BUSINESS DOCUMENTS
In some cases, a proponent may be fortunate enough to have a
range of exclusions and exceptions to choose from in having a busi-
ness document admitted into evidence. 18 5 In other cases, a com-
mercial document may not qualify for the business records excep-
tion, but may qualify instead for another exception or an
exclusion. The most significant of these exclusions and exceptions
are the public records exception, admissions of a party-opponent,
and past recollection recorded.1
8 6
A. The Public Records Exception
In many lawsuits, the documentary evidence consists of records
produced or maintained by federal, state or local governmental en-
tities. For such documents, the public records exception should ap-
ply. The public records and business records exceptions are very
similar in their foundational requirements. "The force of public
duty and the presence of routine, systematic practices combine to
make the analogy [of the public records exception] to the excep-
tion for business records compelling.' 81 7 The most significant dif-
ference between the two exceptions lies in the requirement of hav-
ing the custodian appear as a witness. This is due to the
impracticality of having a public custodian or his or her surrogate
appear in court to verify the record is genuine and is held in
proper custody.'
At common law, courts would allow public records to be admit-
ted into evidence if the record was made by a public employee pur-
suant to a public duty.1 89 Furthermore, the recorder must have had
personal knowledge of the facts recorded, or someone with a public
duty and personal knowledge must have reported to the re-
corder.1 90 The two rationales offered for the exception are that a
185. The authors refer to evidence admissible under Rule 801 ("not hearsay" by defi-
nition) as exclusions. See FRE 801. That evidence that is hearsay by the definition in Rule
801, but is admissible under Rule 803, is referred to as exceptions. See FRE 803.
186. There are others, such as the declaration against interest, but these three are the
most common.
187. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 7.18 at 271 (cited in note 28).
188. Id at 272.
189. See generally Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 315 at 888-89 (cited in note
3); Wigmore, 5 Evidence §§ 1630-84 at 615-976 (cited in note 3); John J. Dutton, The Offi-
cial Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule in California, 6 Santa Clara L Rev 2-3 (1965);




public official will perform his or her duty properly and it is un-
likely that he or she will remember details independently of the
record.191
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) is basically a codification of the
common law rule but broadens it by providing for the admissibility
of "factual findings" resulting from public investigations. 192 Evalu-
ative reports in the form of opinions have been construed to be
admissible, despite being based upon evidence that is not necessa-
rily admissible in the proceeding in which the factual findings are
offered.'
9 3
Thus, the public records exception, where applicable, should be
more attractive than the business records exception if the docu-
ment contains some statements in the form of opinions or conclu-
sions."9 In Beech Aircraft Corp. v Rainey,'9 5 the United States Su-
preme Court held that "factual findings" need not necessarily be
something other than opinions.'9 6 The Court noted that the defini-
tion of "finding of fact" given by Black's Law Dictionary is "[a]
conclusion by way of reasonable inference from the evidence."'' 97
Second, Rule 803(8) itself only requires that "reports .. . [set]
forth .. .factual findings." Thus, the language of the Rule does
not create a distinction between "fact" and "opinion" contained in
such reports.' Finally, the Court examined the legislative history
and Advisory Committee Notes, and concluded that reports which
otherwise qualify for the public records exception are not inadmis-
191. FRE 803(8) advisory committee note, citing Wong Wing Foo v McGrath, 196 F2d
120 (9th Cir 1952), and Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v United States, 250 US 123
(1919).
192. FRE 803(8) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of infor-
mation or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FRE 803(8).
193. See, for example, Beech v Aircraft Corp. Rainey, 488 US 153 (1988).
194. See notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
195. 488 US 153 (1988).
196. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 US at 161-62, rev'g Smith v Ithaca Corp., 612 F2d 215
(5th Cir 1980).




sible merely because they contain a conclusion or opinion.199
Reports of governmental agencies may be admitted under the
public records exception without resort to formal hearings. 0 In
Sabel v Mead Johnson & Co., 20 1 the document in issue was a letter
drafted by the director of the Food & Drug Administration's (here-
inafter "FDA") Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products
recommending that a warning be placed on certain drugs which
had been taken by the plaintiff.2 02 The court determined that this
letter was a public record as it was produced by a public agency,
the FDA.203 The court applied the four factors listed in the Advi-
sory Committee Notes to Rule 803(8): "(1) the timeliness of the
investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or expertise; (3) whether a
hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared
with a view to possible litigation. . ," and concluded that in this
case, the letter was properly admitted. 4
While it is occasionally advantageous to have a business record
treated as a public record, sometimes this is not possible. If the
element of a "public duty" is lacking, it may be possible to have
what looks like a public record admitted as a business record.
Another issue in Sabel dealt with notations made by FDA em-
ployees following telephone conversations. The Sabel court held
these notes to be inadmissible under the public records exception
because they were neither "matters observed pursuant to duty im-
posed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report" nor
"factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law. '205 The court claimed that although the
notes were possibly admissible under the business records excep-
tion, since it might have been a regular practice of FDA employees
to record the contents of their phone conversations, the plaintiff
did not lay an adequate foundation for the application of the
199. Id at 170.
200. See Sabel v Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F Supp 135, 156 (D Mass 1990) ("weight of
authority is that no formal proceedings are necessary to satisfy the prerequisites of the
rule"), citing In re Japanese Electronic Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F2d 238, 268 (3d Cir
1983) (no evidentiary hearing or opportunity for cross-examination required), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574 (1986);
and Stephen A. Saltzburg and Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 879
(Michie, 4th ed 1986).
201. 737 F Supp 135 (D Mass 1990).
202. Sabel, 737 F Supp at 140-41.
203. Id at 141.
204. Id at 143-44.
205. Id at 146.
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rule.206 They could not be admitted under the public records ex-
ception because the notes did not have the "built-in indicia of reli-
ability afforded by the existence of a legal duty and legal authority
which underpins the [Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(8)(B) and (C)
exceptions.
'20 7
In Haskell v United States Dept. of Agriculture,08 an investiga-
tive report made by employees of the USDA was held to be admis-
sible on either grounds of the business records exception or the
public records exception. The court found it was admissible as a
business record because it was rendered in the regular course of a
federal agency investigation. 29 Because it was a public agency and
was made pursuant to a public duty, it was also admissible under
the public records exception.21
Thus, in many cases, a document which is produced by a govern-
mental agency could be admitted as either a public record or as a
business record. There is an advantage to having the document ad-
mitted as a public record in that the public records exception does
not require that the official custodian of the record or other quali-
fied witness be brought forward as a sponsoring witness, while the
business records exception would require testimony of the custo-
dian or a qualified witness.21" '
On the other hand, admission as a public record requires proof
that the record was created pursuant to a public duty, while the
business records exception only requires that the record be regu-
larly kept (i.e., business duty). This is why in some cases, like
Sabel, the documents might qualify as a business record (they are
regularly kept) but not as a public record (there is no public duty
to keep the record).
B. Admissions of a Party-Opponent
In some situations, a document may qualify as a business record
but will contain damaging statements which may not be admissible
206. Id.
207. Id, citing Kehm v Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F2d 613, 618 (8th Cir 1983).
208. 743 F Supp 765 (D Kan 1990), aft'd, 930 F2d 816 (10th Cir 1991).
209. Haskell, 743 F Supp at 767.
210. Id, citing Abdel v United States, 670 F2d 73, 76 (7th Cir 1982) (transaction re-
ports of USDA employees completed after each compliance investigation visit held admissi-
ble as business records in de novo proceeding to review a supermarket's disqualification
from the food stamp program); Hotel Employees-Hotel Ass'n Pension Fund v Timperio,
622 F Supp 606, 608 (S D Fla 1985) (records generated in regular course of federal agency
law enforcement investigations admissible under public records exception).
211. See notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to the business records exception. As discussed previ-
ously, the proponent must deal with this situation by finding an
exclusion or exception for the statement within the document.212
The hearsay exclusion for admissions of a party-opponent con-
tained in Rule 801 is a common technique which a proponent can
use to have statements made in business records admitted.1
Admissions of a party-opponent is not an exception to the hear-
say rule. Rather, it is defined in such a way so that it is not hearsay
at all.214 However, defining admissions of a party-opponent as non-
hearsay is an odd way around the hearsay problem, because no ob-
jective guarantee of trustworthiness is required as it is for all the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. "The party is not even required to
have had firsthand knowledge of the matter declared; the declara-
tion may have been self-serving when it was made; and the declar-
ant is probably sitting in the courtroom.1215 But an objective guar-
antee of trustworthiness is not necessary. It is the adversary
relationship between the parties which lends credence to the state-
ment. "A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to
cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save
when speaking under sanction of an oath.
'216
The exclusion from hearsay made for admissions of a party op-
ponent is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) (hereinaf-
ter "Rule 801(d)(2)"), which provides:
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-The
statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in
either his individual or representative capacity or (B) a statement of which
the party has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a state-
ment by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning
the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the ex-
istence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.2
17
Thus, statements contained within a document will be admissible
for the truth of the matter asserted if they qualify as an admission
of a party-opponent regardless of whether the document can sat-
212. FRE 805. See also notes 162-63.
213. FRE 801(d)(2).
214. See Id. Even though admissions of a party would technically fall within the defi-
nition of FRE 801(c), it is excepted in subsection (d) with a little legislative magic.
215. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 262 at 775 (cited in note 3).





isfy the business record test.
A recent Fifth Circuit case involved the use of an admission
within a public document which took the form of an opinion. In
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v Mmahat,21 8 the court held that
a Federal Home Loan Bank Board examination report, which qual-
ified as a public record, was properly admitted by the trial court,
despite the fact that the report contained hearsay statements.
Within the document a brother of one of the defendants, who was
a defendant himself for part of the case, opined that the defendant
encouraged improper loans in his capacity as counsel'for a feder-
ally chartered savings and loan. It was the brother's opinion that
the intention was that the defendant's law firm would make more
fees if these loans were granted.
The Mmahat court held that although the documents were ad-
missible under the public records exception, the statements within
the document were still hearsay. 19 Thus, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 805, that hearsay must have its own exception.2 0 The
court found that since the brother himself was still a defendant at
the time the document was introduced into evidence, "it was
clearly admissible as a non-hearsay admission under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) (2) (A). ' 22'
In summary, certain documents may be highly relevant to your
case, but contain either hearsay within hearsay, as in the Mmahat
case discussed above, or cannot qualify for the business records ex-
ception in the first place. In these situations, the proponent must
find another way to have the document admitted into evidence. If
the document represents or contains a statement which is an ad-
mission of a party-opponent, the document or statement may be
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2).
C. Past Recollection Recorded
In some circumstances where a document does not fit under any
exception to the hearsay rule it may be possible to use the docu-
ment as a record of past recollection.222 This is more difficult than
the other exceptions because it is necessary to put the author of
the document on the stand. If the witness cannot testify suffi-
218. 907 F2d 546 (5th Cir 1990), cert denied, Mmahat v Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
111 S Ct 1387 (1991).
219. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 907 F2d at 551.
220. See FRE 805; note 162.




ciently from his memory, and looking at the document does not
adequately refresh his memory, then the information in the docu-
ment may be admissible as a past recollection recorded.2 23
At common law, it was required that the proponent satisfy four
elements to have a document admitted as past recollection re-
corded. First, "the witness must have had first hand knowledge of
the event.'224 Second, "the written statement must be an original
memorandum made at or near the time of the event and while the
witness had a clear and accurate memory of it. ' '225 Third, "the wit-
ness must lack a present recollection of the event, '226 and fourth,
"the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written
memorandum.
2 7
The exception is now contained in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(5), which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness-A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have
been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
2 8
The information in such documents is considered trustworthy be-
cause of the "reliability inherent in a record made while events
were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them. '229
Thus, a proper foundation for the admission of information in a
document as a past recollection recorded will establish (a) first-
hand knowledge, (b) preparation of the statement at a time suffi-
ciently close to the event, and (c) at least some inability presently
223. Id.
224. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 299 at 864 (cited in note 3), citing Vicks-
burg & Meridian R.R. Co. v O'Brien, 119 US 99 (1886); Kinsey v State, 49 Ariz 201, 65 P2d
1141 (1937); Mathis v Stricklind, 201 Kan 655, 443 P2d 673 (1968).
225. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 299 at 864 (cited in note 3).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. FRE 803(5). Note that the last sentence of the Rule requires that, in most cases,
the document itself not be placed into evidence but rather be read into evidence. This re-
quirement is meant to prevent the jury from giving any more weight to the information in
the document than if the witness had testified only from pure memory. See Lilly, An Intro-
duction to the Law of Evidence at 234 (cited in note 28). Thus, an exception such as the
business records exception or public records exception is preferable, since those exceptions
place the actual document into evidence, and should be used if available.




to recall the event.2"' In addition, it will be necessary for a witness
to testify as to the accuracy of the record.231 This testimony may
be simply that it is the witness' usual practice to record such mat-
ters accurately.
2 32
D. The "Catch-All" Exception
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) contains the hearsay exception
that should be employed as a last resort for admission of documen-
tary evidence. It is assumed that the proponent has attempted to
convince the court that the exhibit is, first, not hearsay, second, an
admission of a party-opponent, third, a business or public record,
or fourth, past recollection recorded. If all four of these arguments
have failed, the proponent is left with the "catch-all" exception
found in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24).2"3
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence realized that they
could not possibly cover every type of out-of-court statement that
should be admissible despite its status as hearsay in just twenty-
three exceptions. 2 4 "Without a separate residual provision, the
specifically enumerated exceptions could become tortured beyond
any reasonable circumstances which they were introduced to in-
clude (even if broadly construed). '23 5 Thus, Congress included
Rule 803(24) in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(24) re-
quires the proponent to establish three things. First, the proponent
230. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 309 at 867 (cited in note 3).
231. Williams v Stroh Plumbing & Elec., Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 94 NW2d 750 (1959).
232. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 303 at 868 (cited in note 3), citing Hancock
v Kelly, 81 Ala 368, 2 So 281, 286 (1887); Newton v Higdon, 226 Ga 649, 177 SE2d 57 (1970)
(lawyer testifies to practice in witnessing wills).
233. FRE 803(24):
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
234. See FRE 803(24) advisory committee note ("It would be ...presumptuous to
assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued and
to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system").




must show that the "statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact."2 36 Second, "the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts. 2 3 7 Third, "the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. 23 s In addition
to these three foundational elements, the proponent must have
provided notice to the opponent sufficiently in advance of trial to
afford the opponent a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
evidence.2"9
These foundational elements are relatively simple to meet. The
more perplexing problem is complying with the threshold require-
ment for the admission of out-of-court statements that do not spe-
cifically fit any other hearsay exception. The threshold require-
ment is that the proponent demonstrate "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. '"240 This section of
the article will first address the three foundational elements and
then discuss in depth the threshold requirement of "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
1. Foundational Elements
The first element, that the statement be offered as evidence of a
material fact, is nothing more than "a restatement of the general
requirement that the evidence be relevant."' 241 However, the second
element requires the proponent to demonstrate that the evidence
is more probative than any other evidence obtainable through rea-
sonable effort.242 The proponent should be prepared to address the
second element, even though the first and third elements do not




239. Id. For a discussion of the requirements of Rule 803(24), see Thomas Black, Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b) (5) - The Residual Exceptions - An Overview, 25
Houston L Rev 13 (1988).
240. FRE 803(24).
241. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 324.1 at 909 (cited in note 3), citing Huff v
White Motor Corp., 609 F2d 286, 294 (7th Cir 1979).
242. Huff, 609 F2d at 294 (statement of deceased truck driver as to origin of truck fire
more probative than other available evidence); United States v Mathis, 559 F2d 294, 298
(5th Cir 1977) (requirement invoked to exclude prior statement of a prosecution witness
who was unavailable to testify); United States v Boulahanis, 677 F2d 586, 588 (7th Cir
1982) (evidence need not be essential; sufficient if it is the most probative reasonably availa-
ble on a material issue).
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general purposes of the rules and the interests of justice will be
served by admitting the evidence, in effect restates Federal Rule of
Evidence 102. ' '243 These preliminary considerations will not be dis-
cussed further except where relevant. The bulk of the case law is
concerned with the required demonstration of "equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
2. Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
Huff v White Motor Corp.244 is a widely cited decision on Rule
803(24). In Huff, the proponent wished to introduce statements
made by the plaintiff's decedent while in the hospital concerning
the nature and cause of the fire which caused his injuries. 245 Al-
though the trial court did not feel that the statements were admis-
sible under Rule 803(24), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed.246 In reaching its decision, the court cited the lack
of any opinion or speculation in the statement, the fact that the
statement was made of his own free will, and the lack of motive to
fabricate, since the statement was against his pecuniary interest.
In contrast, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan in Land v American Mutual Ins. Co.247 refused to allow evi-
dence in the form of an unsworn statement made by plaintiff's de-
cedent to an insurance company claims adjuster. The Land court
considered the character of the declarant's statement, the relation-
ship of the parties, the probable motivation of the declarant in
making the statement, and the circumstances under which it was
made.2 48 Because there was an adverse relationship between both
243. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 324.1 at 909 (cited in note 3), citing Huff,
609 F2d at 294 (interests of justice served by increasing likelihood that jury will ascertain
the truth).
FRE 102 reads: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elim-
ination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined."
244. 609 F2d 286 (7th Cir 1979).
245. Huff, 609 F2d 286, 290 (7th Cir 1979). The defendant had already argued that the
statement qualified as an admission under Rule 801(d)(2), and was overruled.
246. Id.
247. Land v American Mutual Ins. Co., 582 F Supp 1484 (E D Mich 1984) (the plain-
tiff was injured while operating a machine manufactured by the defendant Harris Seybold
Company. Following the accident, she made a statement to the insurance company describ-
ing how she was injured. Land subsequently died under circumstances unrelated to the in-
jury. She had never been deposed, and the plaintiff wished to have the unsworn statement




the declarant and the adjuster to the defendant, and because they
were the only persons present when the statement was made, the
necessary equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
were lacking, and the evidence was not admitted.249 The case of
United States v American Tel. & Tel. Co.250 was an antitrust suit
in which the government wished to have "third-party" documents
admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 803(24). Among these
were memoranda of meetings or conversations which contained a
recital of comments or statements made at said meetings. The
court looked at whether the memoranda reliably represented the
meeting and whether the substantive statements themselves were
trustworthy.
2 51
In looking at the committee notes to Rule 803(1), the American
Tel. & Tel. Co. court discovered that the "substantial contempora-
neity of event and statement negates the likelihood of deliberate or
conscious misrepresentation. '252 This was held to meet the stan-
dard of "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."253 The court went on to determine that the statements were
admissible as well, even though they did not fit perfectly into any
of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. The court looked
at Rule 804(b)(3), the exception for statements against interest,
and found that the theory of that exception applied in this case. 54
The idea behind Rule 804(b)(3) is that persons do not make state-
ments which are damaging to themselves unless they are true. 255
This was another example of an "equivalent circumstantial guar-
antee of trustworthiness."
The case of In re A.H. Robins Co.256 raised issues similar to
those in American Tel. & Tel. Co. Patients had difficulties with
their intrauterine devices (IUDs) and related these problems to
their doctors.2 57 The doctors in turn related the statements to A.H.
Robins Co. employees, who repeated the statements at intracom-
pany meetings.258 The court allowed the admission of the state-
249. Id.
250. 516 F Supp 1237 (D DC 1981).
251. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F Supp 1237.
252. FRE 803(1) advisory committee notes, quoted in American Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F
Supp at 1241.
253. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F Supp at 1241.
254. Id.
255. Id, quoting FRE 804(b)(3) advisory committee notes.
256. 575 F Supp 718 (D Kan 1983).




ments after hearing argument on Rule 803(24).29
The Robins court determined that the statements of such "out-
siders" had a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness because
of the necessity for A.H. Robins to understand the performance of
its product, and that these statements had been produced from
Robins' corporate files.260 Counsel for Robins could not demon-
strate that the doctors' and patients' statements in the documents
lacked trustworthiness and the statements were thus admitted.261
3. The Near Miss Theory
Sometimes the exhibit the proponent wishes to have entered
into evidence is missing one of the foundational elements for an
enumerated exception. Some commentators refer to this as the
"near miss" theory.26 2 Such was the case in United States v
Nivica,2 63 a criminal prosecution for fraud. In that case the prose-
cution attempted to enter certain documents which would have
otherwise qualified for the business records exception, except that
the proponent was unable to demonstrate the fact that the records
were prepared in the course of a regularly conducted business ac-
tivity. This was fatal to the Rule 803(6) foundation, obviously, but
Rule 803(24) was invoked to take its place. The court noted that
the "documents were 'authentic . . .documents of the Defendant;
that the documents were reliable and trustworthy; and that, given
the provenance and character of the materials, their admission was
justified.' ,,264 Furthermore, the opponent's rights were not unfairly
compromised and the interests of justice appeared to be well-
served by their admission.6 5
Courts may not excuse the lack of certain foundational elements.
For example, the public records exception and the business records
exception require public duty and business duty, respectively, as
part of the foundation for each of these exceptions. The lack of
demonstrated duty cannot be compensated for by other equivalent




262. Black, 25 Houston L, Rev at 27 (cited in note 239).
263. 887 F2d 1110 (1st Cir 1989).
264. Nivica, 887 F2d at 1127.
265. Id. See also Karme v Commissioner, 673 F2d 1062, 1064-65 (9th Cir 1982) (al-
though Rule 803(6) did not justify admission of bank records because proof was lacking that
they were kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, court had discretion
to admit them under Rule 803(24)).
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the Ninth Circuit. That court held in United States v Perlmut-
ter266 that the lack of evidence of a duty on behalf of a person
signing a report rendered the document inadmissible. The court
stated that Rule 803(24) could not be used to "circumvent" the
duty to record requirements of Rules 803(6) and 803(8).267
While Perlmutter will not allow the "near miss" theory to make
up for the lack of duty required in Rules 803(6) and 803(8), other
elements may not be as inflexible. The "near miss" theory was ap-
plied by the Fifth Circuit in United States v Hitsman2ss to admit
a college transcript even though the transcript did not qualify as a
business record under 803(6).269 In Hitsman, the custodian of the
record could not qualify it as a business record, because the testify-
ing witness did not have sufficient knowledge that the record was
kept in the regular course of business. The court admitted the rec-
ord based upon 803(24), however, because of the other indicia of
reliability, including authenticity, corroboration and the daily rou-
tine of college administration, which circumstantially guaranteed
trustworthiness.27 o
4. Additional Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
In addition to the cases described above, courts have looked at
the following factors which will favor a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness: corroboration,27' whether the declarant has re-
canted or reaffirmed the statement,272 and whether the declarant is
266. 693 F2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir 1982).
267. Perlmutter, 693 F2d at 1293.
268. 604 F2d 443 (5th Cir 1979).
269. See Black, 25 Houston L Rev at 29 (cited in note 239), citing Hitsman, 604 F2d
443 (5th Cir 1979).
270. Hitsman, 604 F2d at 447.
271. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 324.1 at 909 (cited in note 3), citing United
States v West, 574 F2d 1131 (4th Cir 1978); United States v Garner, 574 F2d 1141 (4th Cir
1978); United States v Ward, 552 F2d 1080 (5th Cir 1977); United States v Barlow, 693 F2d
954 (6th Cir 1982); State v Beam, 206 Neb 248, 292 NW2d 302 (1980). Taking the contrary
view that corroboration is not relevant for purposes of the residual exceptions is Huff v
White Motor Corp., 609 F2d 286, 293 (7th Cir 1979). United States v Boulahanis, 677 F2d
586 (7th Cir 1982), suggests that corroboration may tend to undermine a claim that the
hearsay is the most probative available evidence. Boulahanis, 677 F2d at 588-89.
272. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 324.1 at 907-09 (cited in note 3), citing
United States v Leslie, 542 F2d 285 (5th Cir 1976) (prosecution witness admitted making
statements against accused but testified in his favor, asserting forgetfulness or untruth of
statements); United States v Carlson, 547 F2d 1346 (8th Cir 1976) (witness reaffirmed truth
of grand jury testimony but refused to testify for prosecution at trial); United States v
Barlow, 693 F2d 954 (6th Cir 1982).
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now subject to cross examination.17 1 Certain cases have discussed
the length of time between the event and the statement as being a
significant factor in whether the statement is sufficiently
trustworthy. 4
One equivalent circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness men-
tioned above is statements which go against the declarant's inter-
est.27 5 However, "courts frequently exclude self-serving statements
as untrustworthy, even when such statements actually go against
the declarant's interests. '27 Thus, the discretionary nature of Rule
803(24) renders it an unpredictable tool of admission.
Ultimately, the residual hearsay exception of Rule 803(24) is ex-
tremely fact specific. It seems to be most useful when a document
is very close to admission under another enumerated exception,
and is immune to a "lack of trustworthiness" attack by an oppo-
nent. It is also useful where the logical arguments in support of its
admission are very strong. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it is
unpredictable given the amount of judicial discretion involved.
Therefore, it should only be used where all other attempts have
failed.
In other words, for any out of court statement, the proponent
should first attempt to show that the statement is not in fact hear-
say by virtue of Rule 801(d). If this fails, then the foundation
should be laid for either the business or public records exception.
Finally, after all of these motions have been denied, the proponent
should raise all of the facts that tend to show that the statement is
trustworthy, including all the foundational elements the statement
meets, and move for admission pursuant to Rule -803(24). If that
motion is denied, the information must be put in evidence another
way, such as the live testimony of the declarant.
273. Cleary, ed,,McCormick on Evidence § 324.1 at 907-09 (cited in note 3), citing
United States v Bailey, 581 F2d 341 (3d Cir 1978); United States v Leslie, 542 F2d 285 (5th
Cir 1976); United States v Iaconetti, 406 F Supp 554 (E D NY), aff'd, 540 F2d 574 (2d Cir
1976).
274. See, for example, Robinson v Shapiro, 646 F2d 734 (2d Cir 1981); United States
v Medico, 557 F2d 309 (2d Cir 1977).
275. See, for example, Robinson, 646 F2d 734 (2d Cir 1981); United States v Bailey,
581 F2d 341 (3d Cir 1978); United States v White, 611 F2d 531 (5th Cir 1980); Huff v
White Motor Corp., 609 F2d 286 (7th Cir 1979); United States v Barlow, 693 F2d 954 (6th
Cir 1982).
276. Jonathan E. Grant, The Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthi-
ness Standard for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), 90 Dickinson L Rev 75, 93 (1985).
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V. AUTHENTICATION OF BUSINESS DOCUMENTS
Usually a court will not accept a document into evidence without
the proponent establishing the writing's authenticity through a
sponsoring witness who identifies it and relates it to the cause of
action through some circumstantial method.2 There are a number
of methods used to authenticate evidence: direct authentication,
circumstantial authentication, and self-authentication. Each will
be discussed, including subcategories, seriatim.
A. Direct Authentication
Direct authentication is a method of authentication whereby an
individual who has knowledge of a document's authenticity by way
of witnessing its execution is called to testify. "Ideally the propo-
nent of a business record will call to the stand the person who ac-
tually prepared it and the person who has firsthand knowledge of




Because it would be inconvenient to require direct authentica-
tion in every situation, courts will allow evidence to be authenti-
cated by circumstantial evidence. There must usually be some ad-
ditional evidence other than just the appearance of a signature to
authenticate by circumstantial evidence. 7 9 Some methods of au-
thentication by circumstantial evidence include testimony by a
witness familiar with the type of document that it is genuine, or
that "distinctive characteristics of the appearance or contents of a
document may be shown in support of a finding that the signature
or recital of authorship is authentic.
280
The usual method for authentication by circumstantial evidence,
however, is through testimbny of the regular custodian of the rec-
277. See Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 220 at 688-89 (cited in note 3); John E.
Tracy, The Introduction of Documentary Evidence, 24 Iowa L Rev 436 (1939).
278. Louisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence at 662 (cited in note 46), citing United
States v Wyant, 576 F2d 1312, 1216 (8th Cir 1978) (corporate records were authenticated
for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) by corporate officer, public accountant,
corporate accountant, and corporate manager whose activities were reflected in the records;
this foundation, which included testimony by the "originator" of the records and the "per-
son who compiled them," was "more than adequate" to justify admission into evidence).
279. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 525-27 (cited in note 28).
280. Id at 526.
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ord. 281 Testimony of the person who supervised the preparation of
the document may also be used. 2
"In the end the requirement may be satisfied by anyone who is
familiar with the manner in which the record was prepared, even if
he lacks firsthand knowledge of the matter reported, and even if he
did not himself either prepare the record or even observe its prepa-
ration. '283 But it is essential that the witness be familiar with the
recording procedure.
What is important is that the witness be familiar enough with the prac-
tices of the business in question, and with the circumstances in which the
record was stored and retrieved, to be able to say with assurance based
upon this circumstantial knowledge that the record is what it purports to be
and was prepared in the ordinary course of business in the manner contem-
plated by Rule 803(6).28"
C. Self-Authentication
Under some circumstances, usually under statute, a document
can be authenticated "within its four corners. ' 25 This is known as
"self-authentication." "Analytically, the process of self-authentica-
tion normally involves an assertion on the face of the document
that it is genuine, coupled with an indication (such as an official
281. See United States v Bowers, 593 F2d 376, 380 (10th Cir 1979) (U.S. Postal Ser-
vice report discussing security procedures; custodian of records for postal district testified to
report's origin; the evidence was properly admitted despite fact that witness had not pre-
pared the report). See also United States v Colyer, 571 F2d 941, 947 (5th Cir 1978); United
States v Rose, 562 F2d 409, 410 (7th Cir 1977).
282. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc. v Selected Meat Co., 512 F2d 1158 (7th Cir 1975)
(plaintiff's corporate manager of technical standards and procedures testified that certain
batching records were prepared by his department and filled in by batching operators in the
regular course of business; this testimony sufficed as a foundation for the batching records
under the Federal Business Records Act).
283. Loisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence at 663-65 (cited in note 46), citing United
States v Grossman, 614 F2d 295, 297 (1st Cir 1980) (anyone familiar with manner in which
record was prepared may authenticate); United States v Veytia-Bravo, 603 F2d 1187, 1191-
92 (5th Cir 1979) (anyone familiar with manner in which record was prepared may authenti-
cate, even if the person did not observe the preparation); United States v Ullrich, 580 F2d
765, 771-72 (5th Cir 1978) (anyone familiar with manner in which record was prepared may
authenticate); United States v Evans, 572 F2d 455, 490 (5th Cir 1978) (anyone familiar with
manner in which record was prepared may authenticate); Colyer, 571 F2d at 947 (anyone
familiar with manner in which record was prepared may authenticate, even if lacking first-
hand knowledge or observation of its preparation); United States v Reese, 568 F2d 1246,
1252 (6th Cir 1977) (anyone familiar with manner in which record was prepared may au-
thenticate, even if lacking firsthand knowledge); Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 512 F2d at
1159 (person who makes the record need not testify).
284. Loisell & Mueller, 4 Federal Evidence at 666-67 (cited in note 46).
285. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 433 (cited in note 28).
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seal or stamp) that the asserter is the official duly authorized to
certify authenticity. ' 28 6 Lilly indicates that usually this will be a
notarized document or one in the custody of a public official who
has certified the document.
287
D. Authentication under the Federal Rules
The authentication of documents is covered in the Federal Rules
of Evidence by Rules 901 and 902. Rule 901 lists, by way of illus-
tration, examples of identification sufficient to authenticate a doc-
ument for purposes of the rule. Rule 901(b)(4) provides that "ap-
pearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum-
stances" will satisfy the requirement of authentication. Another
relevant provision is found in subsection (7), which provides that
"evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed
and in fact is recorded or filed in a public office or a purported
public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form,
is from the public office where items of this nature are kept" will
also satisfy the rule. Furthermore, public records are regularly au-
thenticated by proof of custody, without more.2 88
A document will be self-authenticated under Rule 902 if it is a
domestic public document purporting to bear the signature in the
official capacity of an officer or employee of a United States or
State government department or agency thereof. Rule 902 also
provides that certified copies of public records are self-
authenticating.
In the case of Haskell v United States Dept. of Agriculture,
which was discussed earlier, a report prepared by an investigative
aide on food stamp trafficking at a grocery store was held to be
admissible under both the business records exception and the pub-
lic records exception contained in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6)
and (8).289 The report was authenticated by a sworn affidavit of a
federal investigator who had supervised the investigation.290 The
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. FRE 901 advisory committee notes, citing Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence §
191 at 566-70 (cited in note 3), and Wigmore, 7 Wigmore §§ 2158, 2159 at 626-631 (cited in
note 3).
289. Haskell v United States Dept. of Agriculture, 743 F Supp 765 (D Kan 1990),
aff'd, 1991 US App. LEXIS 6026.
290. Haskell, 743 F Supp at 767.
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affidavit was sufficient to authenticate the document for either
exception.29'
E. Authentication by Production
Another case which dealt with authentication of documentary
evidence was Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v Jacobson.292
There, the court held that since the documents sought to be en-
tered were produced by the defendants from their files, and dealt
with -a subject familiar to defendants' employees, the documents
were considered to be authentic.293 A similar case from California
echoes this doctrine. In E. W. French & Sons, Inc. v General Port-
land, Inc.,'294 a case involving antitrust and price-fixing, the court
held that documents found within an alleged conspirator's file were
sufficiently authenticated to warrant admission.
There are other cases where courts have allowed a finding of au-
thentication even though there is no direct evidence in support of
such a finding. In United States v Brown, 95 the documents were
authenticated because they were previously produced in response
to a subpoena, so they were implicitly authenticated. Another
court determined records were authenticated because they were
found in the document producer's warehouse.2 96
Although there is no requirement that a party offering a business
record under Rule 803(6) produce the author of the item,' 97 a
"qualified witness" is required.298 Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v
American Motor Sales Corp. indicates that a "qualified witness" is
one who can explain and be cross-examined concerning the manner
in which the records are made and kept.2 99 It is not necessary that
the qualified witness have personally participated in or observed
the creation of the document.300
Public records will be self-authenticating if they meet the re-
quirements of Rules 901 and 902. This will usually require a certi-
291. Id.
292. 644 F Supp 1240 (N D 11 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 827 F2d 1119 (7th
Cir 1987).
293. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 644 F Supp at 1253.
294. 885 F2d 1392 (9th Cir 1989).
295. United States v Brown, 688 F2d 1112 (7th Cir 1982).
296. Burgess v Premier Corp., 727 F2d 826 (9th Cir 1984).
297. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Staudinger, 797 F2d 908 (10th Cir 1986).
298. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v American Motor Sales Corp., 780 F2d 1049 (1st Cir
1985).
299. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc., 780 F2d 1049. See also Louisell & Mueller, 4 Federal
Evidence at 663-65 (cited in note 46).
300. Pieters v B-Right Trucking, Inc., 669 F Supp 1463 (N D Ind 1987).
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fled copy or signature of a government official or employee. This
rule extends to any United States or state governmental agency.
It is important to bear in mind the technical difference between
an exception to the hearsay rule and authentication. Before the
contents of any doctiment can be considered for an exception such
as the business records exception or the public records exception,
the document itself must be proven to be what you say it is. This
point is amply illustrated by the case of Mayer v Angelica.30 1 The
Mayer case was a civil RICO case in which the plaintiff sought to
introduce a letter which it contended was an admission of a co-
conspirator.3 0 2 Because it fell within an exception to the hearsay
rule, the trial judge skipped the step of authentication, since the
document was blatantly admissible as an admission of a conspira-
tor.3 13 This oversight caused the Seventh Circuit to reverse and
remand.304
Mayer shows that the proponent should always prove that the
document is what it purports to be, before the proponent starts
laying a foundation for the contents of the document to fall within
some exception to the hearsay rule.
F. Judicial Notice
When laying a foundation for a document to be admitted under
the business records exception, it will save some time and effort if
the court takes judicial notice of the fact that the producer of the
record regularly keeps records. "Judicial notice is generally defined
as a judge's utilization of knowledge other than that derived from
formal evidentiary proof in the pending case. °305 Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 covers judicial notice and indicates in subsection (a)
that the "rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts."
Adjudicative facts, in turn, are those facts ". . . to which the law is
applied in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that nor-
mally go to a jury in a jury case. They relate to the parties, their
activities, their properties, their business.
'306
301. 790 F2d 1315 (7th Cir 1986).
302. Mayer, 790 F2d at 1316.
303. Id at 1339.
304. Mayer, 790 F2d at 1341.
305. Weinstein & Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence % 200[01] at 200-02 (cited in note
33). See also Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 Vill L
Rev 528, 530 (1968) ("Judicial notice may be defined generally as a court's acceptance of the
truth of a matter without formal evidentiary proof").
306. Kennith Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Column L Rev 945, 952 (1955).
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Judges are given wide discretion in determining the facts of
which they take judicial notice. Judges may require supplementary
proof even when the matter is well-established common knowl-
edge.30 7 "Generally speaking, in order that a fact may be judicially
noticed, it must be a matter of common and general knowledge, it
must be well and authoritatively settled, and not doubtful or un-
certain, and it must be known to be within the limits of the juris-
diction of the court." 308 Thus, if there were disagreement or wide-
spread difference in belief with respect to the fact in question,
there could be no judicial notice of the fact.309
For example, a federal district court took judicial notice of the
fact that many private law firms do not bill claims for time ex-
pended in keeping daily log sheets of their hours.310 This is roughly
analogous to the fact that most businesses regularly keep records
in their normal course of business. This is unlike the situation in
Brown & Williamson, where the Seventh Circuit determined that
the district court could not take judicial notice of the fact that tel-
evision coverage of a verdict in favor of the cigarette manufacturer
who brought a libel suit was "fair" when it reduced the compensa-
tory damages to $1.00.311
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the nature of the rule against hearsay and the number
and complexity of the exclusions and exceptions to such rule, this
article has only provided an overview of the vast and difficult sub-
ject of documentary evidence. However, proponents should find
many of the topics discussed useful when attempting to enter doc-
uments into evidence. The proponent should keep the following
procedure in mind.
The proponent should first ask the court to take judicial notice
of the fact that the enterprise producing the record regularly keeps
such records in the usual course of its business. The proponent
should then establish the records's relevancy and have the record
authenticated. Finally, the proponent should lay a foundation for
the business records exception or other relevant exclusion or
307. United States v Lamont, 236 F2d 312 (2d Cir 1956).
308. 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence § 22 (1967 & 1990 Supp).
309. Id at § 24.
310. Cook v Block, 609 F Supp 1036 (D DC 1985). See also United States v Ceballos,
719 F Supp 119 (E D NY 1989) (judicial notice could be taken that drug dealers use beepers
and public telephones in plying illicit trade).
311. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 644 F Supp 1240 (N D Ill 1986).
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exception.
When unusual situations are encountered, such as where a busi-
ness record contains an opinion or one record has been integrated
into another, the proponent should remember to establish the ex-
ception or exclusion one at a time. In each case the proponent
should lay an adequate foundation for each element of the excep-
tion or exclusion. If proponents approach documentary evidence in
this methodical, step-by-step manner, it is more likely courts will
admit the documents into evidence.
